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next speaker is the Honorable Richard Wiley, General Counsel for the Depart-
ment of Defense, who is the professional supervisor of some 5,500 lawyers.
I will let him tell what his programs are to implement the programs that the first
three speakers have said they are just bound to get.
The Department of Defense Program to Assure
Compliance with the Laws of War
RICHARD A. WILEY
I might say at the outset, that the Department's programs are not so much
my programs, as they are General Vague's programs; and assuring compliance
will be the responsibility, in large part, of all the lawyers in the Department,
particularly the three Judge Advocates General and the members of their
respective corps.
Let me discuss the three major elements of the Department of Defense Pro-
gram to assure compliance with the laws of war. They involve, first, indoctrina-
tion and training in application of the laws of war, second, the development of
rules applicable to the weapons development process (an area which has not
received much publicity), and, finally, the adoption of regulations called the
"Rules of Engagement" that apply to actual combat situations. There is
another area that does not receive much publicity, that I will just mention as a
footnote. Under legislation enacted last year. the Department of Defense is for
the first time required to submit arms control impact statements directly to the
Congress on new weapon systems which are under development. This obviously
will have a direct effect on the problem which we are discussing this afternoon.
The laws of war have been the subject of education and training in the
Department of Defense for years. However, as a result of the Vietnam experi-
ence. this area has recently received substantial attention. The present policies
and directives, involving both the laws of war generally and weapons develop-
ment in particular, are found in directives and instructions that were rewritten
completely and published in 1974.
With regard to the laws of war, generally, there are three policies and objec-
tives: first, to insure observance and enforcement by the armed forces; second,
to establish preventive programs; and third, and this is most significant as a
result of the Vietnam experience, to insure prompt reporting, thorough inves-
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tigation and appropriate corrective action, respecting alleged violations either
by or against U.S. or allied military or civilian personnel.
The organization of responsibility for assuring compliance with the laws of
war, is about what you would expect: In the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Assistant Secretaries for Manpower, International Security Affairs, and
Public Affairs have appropriate responsibilities, but the primary responsibility
is in the Office of the General Counsel. This office is responsible for overall
legal guidance and coordination regarding all programs and is in contact with
other agencies in this area. The three Secretaries of the Military Departments
have their responsibilities, and here again the lawyers, the three Judge Ad-
vocates General, have a significant role in all aspects of the execution of these
policies, particularly in the area of preparation and dissemination of laws of
war training materials. The three Judge Advocates General also have the
primary responsibility for the identification of training requirements and key
resource material. An illustrative publication was put out in March by the Army
Judge Advocate General's School and is called "Your Conduct in Combat
Under the Law of War." It is intended for general distribution and use within
the Army. It is set up in a cartoon text form, which, based on my own experi-
ence with training of enlisted personnel, should be very appropriate for that
particular environment. There are many similar publications, and more will be
prepared by each of the services. The areas of emphasis have been explained by
the previous speakers: the problem of unlawful orders, rules governing conduct
of hostilities, probable results of acts of violence, inhumane treatment of per-
sonnel, and especially, again, the necessities for reporting promptly and
thoroughly alleged violations.
Now with regard to the latter, the directives published by the Department
of Defense require that a report of a violation be made to the immediate com-
mander. If he is suspected of involvement in the violation, or of covering up the
violation, the obligation is to report to the next higher level of command. An
interesting problem is created, as there was in certain circumstances in Viet-
nam, when there is a failure to report up through several levels of command
channels. Here, quite frankly, the directives of the several services are not
completely consistent. Two of the three services require that a legal officer in
the field becoming aware of a violation of the laws of war not only report to his
immediate client, the commander to whom he reports himself, but also send
an immediate report directly up through professional legal channels to the
Judge Advocate General in Washington. The third service does not directly
require that independent reporting up the line. The policy of the first two is
most significant because, in addition to any other required local and immediate
reporting to inspectors general and the next higher level of chain of command, it
seeks assurance at the outset that the report will reach the most senior levels in
Washington and will be dealt with from the top of the chain of command if,
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for any reason, that report does not come up through the chain. All of the policy
directives further contemplate that violations of the laws of war by American
personnel will be dealt with directly under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
prosecuted through the court-martial system. The Judge Advocates General
of the services are supposed to collect reports and to conduct investigations of
violations by U.S. personnel of the laws of war. There is a special program
established of inspections and periodic reviews by senior level teams, including
JAG officers, to review alleged violations, to inspect U.S. detention facilities
for POWs, and to supervise and review training programs. Finally, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and of each of the Military Departments, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified and Specified Commanders, those who will
actually be responsible for the conduct of combat operations, also have respon-
sibilities to carry out and implement these policies and the necessary training.
Finally, I would like to speak about the so-called Rules of Engagement. The
terminology is used somewhat loosely within the Department of Defense itself
and, what is sometimes called the Rules of Engagement is sometimes called the
"Operating Authorities." The development of the Rules are the primary respon-
sibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Unified and the
Specified Commands: in effect, the combat arms of the department. The Rules
of Engagement delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United
States forces will initiate or continue combat. The Rules of Engagement lay
down the policy applicable to conflicts in general terms regarding tactics which
can and cannot be employed to insure compliance with both United States
domestic law and with obligations under the international laws of war. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Unified and Specified Commands are given specific
training and documentation responsibilities in this special area. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff have their own legal staff, presently composed of four lawyers,
which consults with our office on any questions arising in connection with the
development or interpretation of the Rules of Engagement.
The Operating Authorities are somewhat more specific. These are developed
as far as possible in advance, and if this is not possible, they are developed in
the course of a particular conflict to guide field commanders down to the lowest
operating level as to the restrictions imposed upon their operations, their selec-
tions of targets, and their use of weapons in a particular combat situation. In
Vietnam the American forces, in many cases to their dismay, had to operate
under very close restrictions drawn from the Rules of Engagement and the
Operating Authorities. A number of the limitations set forth in that conflict
were derived from political or policy considerations, but a number of the restric-
tions were derived directly from what was understood to be the United States'
obligations under the international law of war. The restrictions in the Rules and
in the Authorities take both a geographic character and involve definitions in
terms of the types of weapons and the degree of force which can be used in a
particular combat environment.
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